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ABSTRACT

ccording to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), municipal critical infrastructure has become an ideal target for a range of cyber threat actors including near-peer competitors seeking geopolitical gains and decentralized cyber
criminals attempting to hold cities captive for monetary gain.[1] With municipalities predominantly partnering with the private sector for operation of national critical
infrastructure as defined in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21, cities, states, and industry entities find themselves on the front lines—possibly the first line of defense—against a
perpetual barrage of attacks in cyberspace.[2] Accordingly, a dynamic shift from traditional
conflict in the physical world to a homeland defense posture in cyberspace reveals several potential gaps with regard to handling emergency situations, coordinating response
efforts, and restoring basic services for citizens.[3] This article seeks to highlight this dynamic environment, and the inherent gaps that exist in bolstering critical infrastructure
resilience. Accordingly, the Jack Voltaic® (JV) research framework discussed in this article
explores the interconnections among municipal, state, and federal response efforts during
a cyber emergency scenario, with added emphasis on critical findings and themes from its
Jack Voltaic® 2.5 workshop series. This effort brought together key regional stakeholders
from across various levels of governance, the private sector, and academia to discuss the
findings of previous JV exercises, lessons learned, and how similar efforts can strengthen
critical infrastructure, community resilience, and a whole-of-nation approach to handling
cyber threats.[4] This article will highlight common findings and themes from multiple
exercises and workshops that further reinforce current JV research and the Jack Voltaic®
3.0 Legal and Policy Tabletop Exercise (TTX). Finally, this article concludes with a detailed
discussion about JV 3.0, which is scheduled to execute in September 2020.
Keywords – Jack Voltaic®, Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Defense Support to Cyber Incident
Response, Defender 2020, Multi-Domain Operations.
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
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SCENE SETTER

Major General Robin L. Fontes has served as
Deputy Commanding General (Operations),
U.S. Army Cyber Command, since December
2019. She graduated from the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point, N.Y., in May 1986 and
commissioned as a second lieutenant in the
Military Police Corps. During her career, she
has served in a number of command, staff,
and joint positions. She has commanded at
all levels from a company to the Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.
Maj. Gen. Fontes has completed five
operational assignments in Afghanistan,
including four tours supporting OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM and one tour in support
of OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. She
has earned a Bachelor’s degree from the
U.S. Military Academy, Master’s degrees in
International Affairs from the University
of Washington and National Security and
Strategic Studies from the National
Defense University.

An international crisis in Europe prompts the U.S.
President to order the rapid deployment of two brigade
combat teams as a show of force in support of US allies.
Tensions remain high at home and abroad as similar
threats arise on both fronts. Forces are needed
immediately, and any delay further harms US and NATO
interests. US and NATO adversaries begin an immediate
cyber assault on domestic critical civilian-owned
infrastructure at first, but attacks quickly spread to
critical NATO port cities as well. Gas pipelines rupture
and transmission nodes are disrupted, causing interruption in fuel distribution.[5] Widespread power outages
lead to mass disruption of public utilities,[6] overloading
of municipal medical systems, and civil unrest. Social
media and news outlets report on these catastrophes,
exacerbating negative public sentiment. Traffic systems
become overloaded,[7] bringing vehicles to a standstill
across strategic port cities and thus delaying access to
the ports. Emergency operations centers at the municipal
and state levels are unable to deal with this myriad of
crises. Governors activate their state National Guard
units in response to emergency declarations. Agency
directors and Defense Coordination Officers become
overrun with support requests from every region.
Meanwhile, cargo manifests for rail and load plans
at the ports are manipulated, causing incorrect heavy
equipment loads. Some ships partially overturn in port[8],
[9]
; commercial and military shipping is blocked along
the east coast.[10] Military equipment is delivered to the
wrong destination and becomes significantly delayed.
Garrison Commanders lose visibility of their personnel
and equipment and cannot reach local authorities
for resolution. Combatant Commanders around the
world are faced with the responsibility of responding to
adversaries, not knowing where their equipment is or
when it will arrive. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
and Department of Homeland Security commit teams to
investigate and mitigate these local disasters. However,
by the time it is understood that this is a coordinated
cyberattack and force projection operations resume, the
US has failed to respond in a timely manner, resulting in
strategic disaster.
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INTRODUCTION

Major Erik Korn is a U.S Army Cyber Officer
serving as a Research Scientist at the Army
Cyber Institute (ACI) at the United States
Military Academy (USMA). Erik attained a B.S.
in Comparative Politics from USMA in 2009, and
an M.P.A. from Columbia University School of
International and Public Affairs (SIPA) in 2018.
MAJ Korn has previously served in a variety
of operational Military Intelligence (MI) and
Cyber assignments, including Brigade
Collection Manager, ISR Platoon Leader, MI
Company Executive Officer, Cyber Mission
Commander, and Cyber Company Commander.
He currently serves as a member of the ACI’s
Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR)
Research Team, as well as the Jack Voltaic®
3.0 Data Collection and Analysis Lead. Erik also
serves as a co-Course Director for the USMA
Department of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science (EECS) IT460 Cyber Policy,
Strategy, and Operations course, and faculty
advisor for the cadet Cyber Policy Team.

As outlined in the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) Command Vision, the globally interconnected
digital nature of cyberspace and continuing proliferation of technology makes critical infrastructure a prime
target for a multitude of persistent cyber threats.[11]
With over 85% of US critical infrastructure owned and
operated by the private sector, threats to the homeland
are no longer across oceans or borders; they persistently reside within the domestic critical systems that
American citizens depend on for basic services, safety, and security.[12] Cyberattacks in the form of denial
of service, ransomware, and phishing are just some of
the methods that can deliver debilitating effects against
vulnerable critical domestic systems.[13] Increasingly
sophisticated attack techniques and porous defenses
within the US together make plausible a scenario in
which a private company stands as the first line of defense against an attacking nation state. According to a
recent December 2019 report, cyberattacks against local governments are reaching “critical” mass, citing as
many as 948 municipalities, school systems, and health
care providers reporting impacts by just ransomware
alone.[14] Moreover, early decisions made by affected
entities may set precedent for national response, and
even in some ways constrain it. Recognizing the urgency of this growing threat, the Army Cyber Institute
(ACI) at West Point launched the Jack Voltaic® (JV) research series aimed at studying critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities in collaboration with industry and local
government stakeholders to improve resiliency in interdependent systems from the bottom-up.
BACKGROUND
JV is the ACI’s research project that focuses on the
study of critical infrastructure resiliency and public-private partnerships, as well as municipal cyber incident response, recovery, and remediation efforts. In
addition to supporting increased critical infrastructure
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Lieutenant Colonel Doug Fletcher is a U.S.
Army Operations Research Systems Analyst
Officer currently serving as a Senior Research
Scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at the
United States Military Academy. Doug attained
a B.S. in Applied Mathematics from the United
States Military Academy in 1997, an M.S. in
Applied Mathematics from the Naval
Postgraduate School in 2007, and his Ph.D. in
Statistics from Temple University in 2019. He is
currently the project lead for Jack Voltaic® 3.0,
a research event into how cyberattacks against
commercial critical infrastructure impact Army
force projection. Doug’s current research
interests include exercise design, statistical
learning, and generalized linear modeling.

resiliency, this initiative also works to better inform our
understanding of the nation’s dependence on local governance and civilian critical infrastructure, specifically
potential impacts on force projection capabilities in the
event of local disruption. The JV concept grew from the
energy sector’s efforts in developing cyber mutual assistance, supporting sector coordination and resourced
responses to major cyber incidents.[15] JV expands this
concept across multiple sectors of critical infrastructure
as a result of the interconnected nature of cyberspace,
creating both sector-specific and multi-sector dependencies. Whereas most federal efforts aim at improving
resiliency focus on regional or multi-state emergency
response, JV takes a unique approach by focusing on
the city level, where the density of both critical infrastructure and population is greatest. This bottom-up
approach identifies key stakeholders and public-private
partnerships, experimental design elements, governance hierarchies, exercise simulations, and relevant
data collection points to elucidate critical insights regarding existing gaps, vulnerabilities, and successes
of cyber incident response.[16] These unique bottom-up
perspectives thus personify the critical need for integrating security considerations into incident response
at all levels, and thereby helps to codify real-world cyber emergency response efforts to alleviate confusion
during the heat of a real crisis.
The ACI began this effort in 2016 with Jack Voltaic®
1.0. In partnership with Citigroup, this event brought
together private sector, federal, state, and local government stakeholders to simulate a “Cyber Worst Day” scenario in which key segments of New York City’s critical
infrastructure became severely degraded as a result of
a cyber incident. This iteration of JV featured both adversary and friendly response network engagements in
a simulated environment in parallel with a key leader
tabletop exercise (TTX). The two-day event in New York
City involved 25 organizations and 137 participants
from 6 different critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Emergency Services, Communications,
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Healthcare, Energy, and Transportation Systems.[17] In
addition to establishing critical partnerships among
the ACI, New York State, and New York City (NYC), it
also helped NYC create a new cybersecurity agency,
the New York City Cyber Command (NYC3).[18] The key
findings from the first iteration emphasized the importance of a rehearsed city-level response plan nested
within the state and federal response. While there are
existing means at the federal and state level to enable
cyber preparation, prevention, and response, it remains
imperative that cities also develop, practice, and support their own cyber incident response.

Major Jason Hillman is a Cyber Strategist
and Research Scientist for the Army Cyber
Institute at West Point. He also serves as
an instructor in the U.S. Military Academy’s
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Department. Jason graduated from West Point
with a B.S. in Systems Engineering in 2005 and
earned an M.S. in Cybersecurity from Webster
University in 2018. His military service includes
serving at increasing levels of responsibility
starting at the tactical level as a platoon leader,
up to and including Deputy Chief of Operations
for Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan. Jason’s primary research focus at
ACI is critical infrastructure resilience. He maintains the following military skills and industry
certification: Strategic Planner (6Z), Joint
Planner (3H), Joint Cyber Operations Planner
(3K), Space Enabler (3Y), Certified Information
System Security Professional (CISSP).

The second iteration of JV took place with the city
of Houston in partnership with infrastructure company
Architecture Engineering Construction Operations and
Management (AECOM) and Cybersecurity firm Circadence, again focusing closely on the study of potential
gaps in resilience, emergency municipal coordination,
and appropriate incident response. Jack Voltaic® 2.0
sought to expand on the previous iteration through
exploration of a cyberattack following the occurrence
of a devastating hurricane. Furthermore, by including
elements in the scenario that affected the port of Beaumont, TX, this iteration of JV explored impacts on the
Army’s ability to deploy forces in defense of the nation
due to a physical incident and cyberattack on a large
American port city. JV 2.0 consequently assisted in establishing critical partnerships between government
and industry, thereby enabling new Army public-private partnerships to take shape. JV 2.0 provided numerous findings and lessons learned, resulting in its
inclusion in the 2019 National Defense Authorization
Act Section 1649 as a method to assess and analyze
critical infrastructure resiliency.[19] Two key findings of
JV 2.0 furthered multi-level government cyber incident
response. First, policy and legal authorities at the federal and state levels should be reviewed and adjusted to
enable and complement cyber incident response at the
city level.[20] Furthermore, current physical and cyber
incident response frameworks require a review from

|

FALL 2020 49
This content downloaded from
4.30.218.68 on Wed, 17 Mar 2021 20:42:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

JACK VOLTAIC®: BOLSTERING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE

city to state to federal (“bottom-up”) to allow the most
flexibility in response to the rapidly evolving threat of
cyberattacks.[21] In addition to these critical insights on
cyber incident response, the second iteration of JV further illuminated the importance of civil and commercial critical infrastructure for the U.S. Army and helped
guide additional research focus areas for Jack Voltaic®
3.0.[22]

Lieutenant Colonel Erica Mitchell is the
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
(CIKR) Research Group Chief for the Army
Cyber Institute and Assistant Professor in the
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Department at the United States Military
Academy (USMA) at West Point. She graduated
from West Point with a B.S. in American Legal
Systems, was commissioned as a Signal Corps
officer, and later transitioned to an Information Systems Management Officer (FA26B).
She earned an M.S. in Information Systems
Management, C.A.S. in Information Security
Management, and Ph.D. in Information Science
and Technology from Syracuse University. Her
military service includes serving at increasing
levels of responsibility, starting at the tactical
level as a platoon leader, up to and including
project management on DoD-level enterprise
technology programs. Her main research focus
at ACI is critical infrastructure resilience. She is
a member of ACM and ISC2 and maintains the
CISSP certification.

While exercises in JV 1.0 and 2.0 produced findings
and insights that support improved critical infrastructure resiliency, there are also other complementary
events that contribute to achieving the overarching series objectives. These events highlight unique stakeholder insights on authorities, mitigation, and remediation that together identified a need for building
municipal incident response frameworks capable of simultaneously addressing both cyber and physical incidents; this includes “cross-border and city-state-National Guard cooperation” that can further facilitate cyber
personnel and capability resource sharing across existing structures.[23] In addition to planning workshops
that support a specific exercise, a series of smaller oneday city-focused JV 2.5 workshops provided individual
cities an opportunity to learn from the Jack Voltaic® research series, discuss how those findings apply to their
environment, and improve partnerships across local
sectors.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Crisis management and remediation is
personality driven.
While the original research thesis centered around
establishing structural lines of communication to mitigate personnel changeover, comments from participants and observations during Jack Voltaic® events
have led to a contrary broader and somewhat different conclusion. Rather than just documenting lines of
communication to draw upon during an actual crisis,
it became apparent that individuals from disparate
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Major Steven Whitham is a cyber warfare
officer serving as a research scientist at the
Army Cyber Institute. MAJ Whitham graduated
with a B.S. in Computer Science from the
United States Military Academy at West Point
in 2009 and M.S. in Computer Science from
the University of Washington in 2018. He is
currently the lead scenario designer for the
Jack Voltaic® research project. His research
areas of interest include machine learning,
artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and
exercise design.

organizations primarily rely on those they know. Rather than fight this tendency, organizations can better
encourage familiarity among individuals and groups
through regularly hosted events to build essential interpersonal and professional bonds for cyber incident
response. Encouraging key personnel from distinct
organizations, especially those in municipal emergency management, to attend these events is critical to
improving communication across sectors and will ultimately lead to enhanced resilience. We recommend
municipalities place strong emphasis on developing
personal relationships and exchanging contact information during emergency preparedness drills in addition to practicing response actions and organizational
responsibilities.
2. Individuals and organizations tend to lack
experience with real cyber events and thus
have difficulty visualizing second-, third-,
and fourth-order effects; this inhibits a true
understanding of interdependencies among
organizations.
Municipalities, private companies, and other critical stakeholders typically conduct self-contained drills
that unintentionally gloss over second-, third-, and
fourth-order effects, ultimately detracting from a more
complete understanding of the impacts to their organizations and subsequent interdependencies. During JV
workshops, participants were able to identify the immediate impacts that cyber events would have on their
organizations but generally lacked the ability to extend
that impact to other interdependent entities. Full understanding of interdependencies is difficult to imagine in
advance, but without exception participants in JV workshop events commented on learning about how much
their organizations truly rely on other sectors, and how
much other organizations relied on theirs. Participants
from local government who participated in the planning for a full Jack Voltaic® scenario also remarked how
the act of simply coming together for a planning workshop was a huge boon for them, raising interrelated
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issues they had never thought to consider and introducing participants to key personalities,
even within the local area. We recommend crisis management drills incorporate as broad a set
of interested parties as possible from public and private sectors, at all levels of responsibility.
Additionally, we recommend moderators for such drills allow time for participants to exercise
creativity in considering how effects and responses to events may cause ripple effects, especially in prioritizing resources during incident response.
3. Municipalities and private entities tend to lack cyber policies, whether specific 		
frameworks or as annexes to existing crisis management policies, and too often
treat cyber incidents as information technology concerns.
Accordingly, when cyber incidents lead to physical events, existing crisis management
documentation does not specify thresholds beyond the most extreme events and appear insufficient to handle situations wherein the causes of problems (cyber or mechanical) are not
immediately known. Emergency management and incident response must therefore start
including cyber as one of its critical components. Cyber intrusions are predominately considered an information technology (IT), not operational, problem at numerous levels of governance. Leaders often fail to recognize that the operation and maintenance of IT systems is
a discipline and skill set unto itself. IT professionals may share underlying technical knowledge with IT security professionals, but their expertise and focus areas are dramatically
different. This gap is further exacerbated with respect to operational technology (OT), the
systems which undergird industrial infrastructure. Our JV workshops highlight a shortfall
in understanding the full scope of threats to municipal critical infrastructure that currently exist with respect to building both IT and OT resilience. Leaders of organizations must
stop treating cyber intrusion as a purely IT problem and begin treating it as an operational
problem. Cities also tend to lack adequate cyber response policies in the form of specific
documentation or as annexes to existing crisis management policies. This gap highlights the
necessity of these critical stakeholders having these important conversations during events
like JV in order to identify, discuss, and address previously siloed response actions that do
not address important security considerations across sectors, community lifelines, and critical organizations. Additionally, even after including cyber events into existing crisis drills,
incorporating effective measures, and resourcing them can take years for full maturation.
We recommend organizations and municipalities incorporate scenario events into their regular drills designed to exploit gaps in current policy and force decision points that currently
are not clearly defined.
4. Municipalities and organizations generally do not know what resources are
available or who provides them during a cyber event; this results in hesitancy to
declare a cyber incident.
Cyber incidents are by nature more difficult to identify than physical events, especially
when a cyber intrusion causes a physical event. Federal and state resources are available
across the country to assist with cyber incidents, but these resources may be slow to arrive if
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it takes time to ascertain cyber intrusion as a cause. This can lead to a situation where those
municipalities that have the greatest need for support lack the initial resources to determine
what factors qualify them to request it. Exacerbated by the reality of our previous finding
regarding policies, municipality emergency response personnel are often reluctant to claim
a cyber incident is occurring, even at cyber resilience workshops, because their policies
do not allow for such a declaration without higher approval. Local government and private
sector participants at workshops were often surprised to learn that resources were available
from entities like DHS, or that some states have extended their State Emergency Assistance
Compacts to include cyber incident response. Federal-level cyber exercises tend to be held
at state and regional levels, attempting to provide the greatest support to the biggest area.
Unfortunately, this tends to leave municipality personnel unaware of available cyber resources. We recommend municipality drills include scenario events designed to exhaust locally
available resources due to effects from cyber incidents, thus forcing participants to make
resource requests and establish important lines of communication with supporting entities.
CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD WITH JACK VOLTAIC® 3.0 EXECUTION
The next full iteration of this research framework will occur with Jack Voltaic® 3.0, planned
for September 2020. In concert with industry, municipal, and academia partners, the ACI
will continue to study local response efforts during a multi-sector and multi-location cyber
incident. This JV iteration will specifically focus on the cascading impacts of a cyberattack
against municipal critical infrastructure, and how this affects the Army’s ability to deploy
and project forces. The third iteration of this study is currently finalizing plans and will occur as a completely distributed event in September 2020 with both the cities of Charleston,
South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia.
The JV3.0 exercise remains focused on examining and analyzing the impact of a cascading
cyber incident delivering a range of effects against municipal critical infrastructure, the
same critical infrastructure upon which the nation depends for its force projection capabilities. US port facilities exemplify one such critical infrastructure on which the Army depends
on for force projection. A recent cyber incident in December 2019 resulted in 30 hours of
degraded operations at a single maritime facility, demonstrating just how much damage
can be inflicted with the occurrence of a similar cascading event occurring at multiple port
facilities.[24] Accordingly, outlined research objectives for this iteration remain focused on
building resiliency from the bottom-up, while also studying consequent impacts on the nation’s ability to quickly move soldiers, equipment, and supplies to an active and potentially
hostile area of operations (AO). As such, concerted efforts were made to nest earlier JV 3.0
events with the Army’s DEFENDER-Europe 2020 exercise, the largest exercise covering deployment from the US to Europe in over 25 years.[25] This exercise will consequently bring
together municipal, county, state, and federal stakeholders, along with critical members of
industry and academia, to continue building comprehensive and holistic domestic critical
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infrastructure resilience. Jack Voltaic® 3.0 will therefore focus on examining the following
targeted research objectives:

m Exercise multiple cities in emergency cyber incident response, both for ensuring public
services and safeguarding critical infrastructure.

m Reinforce a “whole-of-community” approach in response to cyber events through
sustained multi-echelon partnerships across industry, academia, and government.

m Examine the coordination process for providing cyber protection capabilities in support
of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) requests.

m Develop a repeatable and adaptable framework that allows cities to exercise its response
to multi-sector cyber incidents.

m Examine how cyberattacks on civilian critical infrastructure impact force projection.
Through these mutually supporting objectives, JV3.0 remains committed to building domestic critical infrastructure resiliency, facilitating partnerships, addressing gaps, codifying interdependencies, reinforcing holistic and comprehensive solutions to cyber incident response,
and better enabling a whole-of-community approach. These factors not only ubiquitously affect
force projection capabilities, but also directly impact the safety, security, and resilience of the
American people. In a time characterized by Multi-Domain complexities within an emerging operational environment, defense of the homeland remains a paramount function of this effort.[26]
The National Security Strategy (NSS) further reinforces this function, specifically highlighting
the importance of critical infrastructure resiliency as a crucial facet of national protection,
capabilities, and defense efforts; this includes deterring and disrupting malicious cyber threat
actors from inflicting “catastrophic or cascading consequences.”[27] Accordingly, the Jack Voltaic® Research Series seeks to facilitate comprehensive solutions, reinforce a whole-of-nation
approach, and adequately address persistent challenges within this interdependent threat
landscape that increasingly includes US homeland municipalities.
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